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INTRODUCTION
At the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention in 1787, in the midst of a debate
over the selection of judges, Benjamin Franklin proposed that lawyers ought to
decide who should sit on the federal courts.' After all, Franklin quipped, the
attorneys would select "the ablest of the profession in order to get rid of him, and
share his practice among themselves."2 Franklin was joking, of course, but the
question of who should appoint federal judges was no laughing matter at the
Convention. Quite the opposite: it was a - perhaps the - major source of
contention pertaining to the federal judiciary, with the delegates contemplating
several different plans. Those who opposed a strong executive (e.g., George
Mason, Elbridge Gerry, and Oliver Ellsworth) wished to follow the dominant state
practice and vest appointing authority in Congress Others (e.g., Alexander
Hamilton, James Madison, and Gouverneur Morris) wanted the executive to appoint
judges." It was Hamilton who first suggested that the president nominate and the
Senate confirm all federal judges,' but the Convention twice rejected this
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See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 55 (1990).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 57-60.
4Id.
' Though Hamilton originally supported a proposal that the president alone make
appointments to the courts, he was the first to make the general suggestion that the president
nominate judges with the Senate having the authority to "reject or approve" candidates. See
Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Advice and Consent: The Role of the United States Senate in the
Judicial Selection Process, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 200, 201-02 (1987); Randall R. Rader, The
Independence of the Judiciary: A Critical Aspect of the Confirmation Process, 77 KY. L.J.
767, 782 (1989). But it was Nathaniel Gorham (from Massachusetts) who proposed,
following constitutional practice in his state, that the president nominate with the "advice and
consent" of the Senate. See FARBER& SHERRY, supra note 1, at 57; Rader, supra at 782. For
more on the constitutional debates surrounding the selection of federal judges, see generally
John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation
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compromise before finally adopting it.6 Following British practice and that
emerging in the states, the new Constitution provided that federal judges should
serve during good behavior
By the end of the convention, the Framers had made two choices with regard
to the employment of federal judges: how they would be selected and how long
they would retain their jobs. But did they make good choices? Judging from
contemporary commentary, especially on the United States Supreme Court, the
answer seems to be "no."' As Professors David Strauss and Cass Sunstein write,
"[i]t is difficult to find anyone who is satisfied with the way Supreme Court Justices
are appointed today."9 That may explain why scholars and other observers have,
in their quest to remedy perceived defects in the system, offered mounds of
proposals - from advocating that the Senate submit a list of potential nominees to
the president with a goal of producing a more intellectually and legally
distinguished bench,'" to recommending that the Senate refrain from taking into
account nominees' judicial philosophies with an aim of creating a more independent
judiciary."
These are just a few examples; the range of proposals is large and the goals they
seek to accomplish are many in number.' And yet, for all their variation in
substance and purpose, lurking beneath most of them is a simple assumption:
formal and informal rules governing the selection and retention ofjudges "matter."
Given that some of the most fervent constitutional debates over the institutional
design of the judicial branch - whether they transpired in Philadelphia in 1787,'"
Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633 (1993); David
A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process,
101 YALE L.J. 1491 (1992).
6 See Rader, supra note 5, at 783-85.
7 See FARBER& SHERRY, supra note 2, at.60.
s See, e.g., Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 5.
9 Id. at 1491.
'o See, e.g., Mathias, supra note 5; Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Taking Advice Seriously: An
Immodest Proposal for Reforming the Confirmation Process, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1577
(1992); Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 6. Creating a judiciary of "greater distinction" is not
the only objective afoot here. Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1491. Another is to
provide the Senate with a meaningful "advice" role without encroaching on the president's
power to appoint. Reynolds, supra at 1580.
" See, e.g., Richard D. Freidman, Tribal Myths: Ideology and the Confirmation of
Supreme Court Nominations, 95 YALE L.J. 1283 (1986) (reviewing LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: How THE CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
SHAPES OUR HISTORY (1985)); Rader, supra note 5.
" For summaries of proposals to reform the selection system, see STEPHEN L. CARTER,
THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 187-206
(1994); GEORGE L. WATSON & JOHN L. STOOKEY, SHAPING AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS 215-19 (1995).
'3 See LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING
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or in Moscow in 1993-94"4 - implicated not its power or competencies, but who
would select and retain its members, political actors apparently agree."5
AMERICA: INSTITUTIONAL POWERS AND CONSTRAINTS 58-60 (3d ed. 1998); FARBER &
SHERRY, supra note 1, at 51-77.
14 See Alexander Blankenagel, The Court Writes Its Own Law, E. EUR. CONST. REV.,
Summer/Fall, 1994, at 74, 75; Herbert Hausmaninger, Towards a "New" Russian
Constitutional Court, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 349, 368 (1995).
"s See generally EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES (1944) (tracing
controversies over judicial selection and tenure back to the fourth century B.C.). For
examples and discussions of particular debates, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LAW 323-39 (1973); RALPH A. WOOSTER, THE PEOPLE IN POWER:
COURTHOUSEAND STATEHOUSE IN THE LOWER SOUTH, 1850-1860, at 64-80 (1969); Paul D.
Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts,
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 79; Anthony Champagne, Judicial Reform in
Texas, 72 JUDICATURE 146 (1988); Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel, Introduction, in
JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES 1 (Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel eds. 1993); A.
John Pelander, Judicial Performance Review in Arizona: Goals, Practical Effects and
Concerns, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 643 (1998); John M. Roll, Merit Selection. The Arizona
Experience, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 837 (1990); Joseph H. Smith, An Independent Judiciary: The
Colonial Background, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1104 (1976); Malcolm Smith, The California
Method of Selecting Judges, 3 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1951); Peter D. Webster, Selection and
Retention of Judges: Is There One "Best" Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1995);
Martha Andes Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English andAmerican
Precedents, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 135; Samuel Latham Grimes, Comment, "Without Favor,
Denial, or Delay ": Will North Carolina Finally Adopt the Merit Selection of Judges?, 76
N.C. L. REV. 2266 (1998); Glenn C. Noe, Comment, Alabama Judicial Selection Reform:
A Skunk in Tort Hell, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 215 (1997-1998).
Why institutions governing selection and retention engender such controversy is an
interesting question, with no shortage of answers. But surely a principal one is that political
actors and the public alike believe these institutions will affect the type of men and women
who will serve and, in turn, the choices they, as judges, will make. Hence, the controversies
are not so surprising, nor is the immense scholarly and public interest in the general subject
ofjudicial selection. This interest has been manifest for decades. As Haynes noted in 1944,
"[w]hole shelves could be filled with the speeches, debates, books and articles that have been
produced.., dealing with the choice and tenure ofjudges." HAYNES, supra at 4-5. Writing
nearly forty years later, Philip Dubois made a similar observation: "[I]t is fairly certain that
no single subject has consumed as many pages in law reviews and law-related publications
over the past fifty years as the subject ofjudicial selection." Philip L. Dubois, Accountability,
Independence, and the Selection of State Judges: The Role of Popular Judicial Elections,
40 Sw. L.J. (Special Issue), May 1986, at 31, 31.
What is surprising, though - as even a glance at the writings of which Haynes and Dubois
speak would reveal - is that the studies focus almost exclusively on the selection of
American judges; with few exceptions, comparative work is virtually non-existent. But cf
MARY L. VOLCANSEK & JACQUELINE LUCIENNE LAFON, JUDICIAL SELECTION: THE CROSS-
EVOLUTION OF FRENCH AND AMERICAN PRACTICES (1988); Burton Atkins, Judicial Selection
in Context: The American and English Experience, 77 KY. L.J. 577 (1989); John Bell,
Principles and Methods of Judicial Selection in France, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1757 (1988);
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As do we. Indeed, we invoke the assumption that institutions "matter" as the
centerpiece of our attempt to examine two goals that seem especially important to
scholars offering proposals to reform the existing rules for the appointment and
retention of federal jurists: creating and sustaining an (1) intellectually and legally
distinguished and (2) a politically independent bench.
Our interest in so doing lies not in debating whether these goals are worthy
(though we believe that they are), that they fit with the intent of the Framers (though
we believe that they do), or that the current institutions governing judicial selection
and retention meet them (though we believe that they do not). What interests us
rather is this: assuming that we desire to design formal rules that would maximize
the achievement of a distinguished and independent bench, what would those rules
look like?
To address this question, we need not create new rules out of whole cloth. For
the world's democracies have devised, in the form of formal constitutional
provisions and laws, a number of responses to the query we propose - responses
that the vast majority of American scholars have not contemplated.' 6 In light of
chronic complaints with the modes of appointment and retention of U.S. state and
federal jurists, 7 this void in our thinking is notjust surprising; it is also unfortunate.
For, before we weigh the sorts of rules (much less the wholesale changes or even
mere alterations in the existing rules that some scholars and policy makers have
proposed) 8 that might induce particular outcomes - be those outcomes a more
distinguished judiciary, a more independent one, or both - ought we not to
consider the range of existing possibilities?
Believing that the answer to this question must be in the affirmative, we
undertake that consideration here. Specifically, we use the results of an inventory
we conducted of formal judicial selection and retention systems currently in use in
democratic societies throughout Europe to shed light on the sorts of institutions that
may lead to a more distinguished and independent judiciary here in the United
David J. Danelski, The People and the Court in Japan, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH
45 (Joel B. Grossman & Joseph Tanenhaus eds., 1969); George H. Gadbois Jr., Selection,
Background Characteristics, and Voting Behavior of Indian Supreme Court Judges, 1950-
1959, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 221 (Glendon Schubert & David J. Danelski
eds., 1969); David J. Meador, German Appellate Judges: Career Patterns and American-
English Comparisons, 67 JUDICATURE 16 (1983); Fred L. Morrison, The Swiss Federal
Court: Judicial Decision Making and Recruitment, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH,
supra at 133; T. Leigh Anenson, Note, For Whom the Bell Tolls... Judicial Selection by
Election in Latin America, 4 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 261 (1997). We know practically
nothing about how the various mechanisms for the appointment and retention of jurists
elsewhere operate; we do not even have a good sense of the range of alternatives invoked by
societies outside the United States.
6 See supra note 15 for the limited exceptions.
17 See supra notes 9-11 & 15.
'8 See supra notes 10-12.
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States. In Part I of this essay, we explain in some detail how we carried out the
inventory, with specific emphasis on what countries we included, on what courts we
focused, and from where we gathered our data. Next, in Part II, we turn to the goal
of creating and preserving a legally and intellectually distinguished judiciary. In so
doing, we focus on institutional provisions abroad governing qualifications for
appointment to the bench and for maintaining ajudicial seat - in other words, rules
that the American Framers did not explicate with any degree of specificity. Part Ill
considers the objective of devising an independent bench. Here we explore the
various rules promulgated in Europe pertaining to the retention ofjustices, which
range considerably - from life tenure to limited service to renewable terms. The
analysis here, as well as in Part II, leads to a straightforward conclusion: if creating
and sustaining an (1) intellectually and legally distinguished and (2) politically
independent bench are goals that political actors want to maximize, they should
consider taking cues from their colleagues in other democracies and devise different
institutions for selecting and retaining American justices.
I. A COMPARATIVE INVENTORY OF INSTITUTIONS GOVERNING THE SELECTION
AND RETENTION OF JUSTICES: SOME METHODOLOGICAL NOTES
Undergirding this essay is the idea that institutions governing the selection and
retention of justices abroad can help shed light on the sorts of rules we ought to
adopt in the United States if we hope to maximize the attainment of an intellectually
and legally distinguished and politically independent federal bench. Animating this
idea required us to collect data on those institutions - that is, to conduct inventory
of rules in use elsewhere.
In attempting to conduct this inventory, three questions loomed large: (1) what
countries to include; (2) on what courts to focus; and (3) from where should we
collect the data? What follows explains the answers we reached.
A. Countries Included
Nearly 200 countries exist in the world today, and we could have included
virtually all of them in our study. We did not do so, however, opting instead to
focus on twenty-seven European nations 9 that are parliamentary or presidential
democracies, 0 and that have courts with the power to review government acts to
'9 The twenty-seven countries are: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.
20 See WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PARLIAMENTS AND LEGISLATURES (George Thomas
Kurian ed., 1998) [hereinafter WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA] (describing all but three countries-
Armenia, Georgia, and Slovakia - of interest here as "parliamentary democracies,"
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determine their compatibility with the nation's constitution. We chose to focus on
these societies for several reasons, not the least of which is that there is variation
in the age of their contemporary constitutional documents (specifically, of
provisions dealing with their courts), ranging from Austria (1929) to Albania
(1998)." Such variation enables us to explore both older and newly devised
answers to our primary research question. Yet another reason for our focus on
Europe is that information on these countries is available from a number of sources,
permitting an inference of reliability that we cannot make for many nations in other
regions.22
B. Courts Investigated
When it comes to the Constitution, Americans are a proud bunch. They may
point out that it is the oldest surviving of such documents in the world today, that
many societies have looked to it when drafting their own charters, or even that
countries have adopted its provisions verbatim. The latter is certainly true with
regard to particular features of the U.S. Constitution, but it does not hold true for
judicial selection and retention. In fact, many democratic nations have rejected the
choices made by the American Framers, adopting instead a multitude of other
schemes, such as "parity" in selection23 and renewable terms for retention. 4
Why the various societies made the choices they did has, in all likelihood, a
good deal to do with the aims they had in mind for their courts. The institutional
designers in many nations did not have the same vision for their highest
constitutional courts as did the majority of America's founders. So, for example,
while the U.S. Framers gave federal jurists life tenure presumably to maximize
judicial independence, other nations opted for renewable terms presumably to
maximize accountability.
Selection and retention mechanisms were not the only ways in which
democratic societies elsewhere departed from the American framework. Another
critical distinction comes in the types of courts they created to exercise
including the United States).
2 Actually one of the oldest and newest constitutions in our sample is Latvia's, which
was adopted in 1922 but substantially amended and revised in 1998. See LAT. CONST., at
http://www.vemet.lv/VT/constitution.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2001).
22 We return to the subject of data sources below in Section C.
23 Under "parity systems", various actors are able to nominate a specified number of
judges. So, for example, in Georgia, "[t]hree members of Constitutional Court shall be
appointed by the President, three members shall be elected by the Parliament by at least three
fifth [sic] of the total number of deputies and three members shall be designated by the
Supreme Court of Georgia." The Constitutional Court Law of Georgia, ch. 2, art. 6 (1996)
(Geor.), available at http://www.constcourt.gov.ge/lcourte.html.
24 For more on renewable terms, see infra Table 5 and accompanying text.
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constitutional review. While all courts in the U.S. federal system (and those abroad
modeled after it) can review acts to determine their compatibility with constitutional
documents (the "American" model), in many other nations only those tribunals
designated as constitutional courts (or some variant on that title) can do so; the
"ordinary" tribunals cannot (the "European" model).
This may be the most fundamental difference between the two basic models of
constitutional review but many others exist, with Table I denoting those most
prominent in the literature.2" Appreciating the distinctions may be best
accomplished through an example of how a constitutional case might proceed in the
United States (and other countries that pattern their courts on the American system)
and in Russia (and other countries that invoke a similar version of the European
model).26
Assume that the United States Congress passes a piece of legislation outlawing
the burning of the American flag, and that the Russian Parliament enacts a similar
law. Further assume that individuals in both countries desire to challenge their
respective laws on constitutional grounds. In America, the individual would have
to present a real case or controversy, one in which she would have a personal and
real stake in the outcome.27 To create such a dispute, she might violate the law by
burning an American flag, having herself arrested, and ultimately facing trial in a
federal district court. If she lost there, she might appeal to a U.S. Court of Appeals.
Finally, assuming that the circuit court affirmed the trial judge's decision, she could
attempt to attain review in the U.S. Supreme Court, though her chances of
convincing the justices to grant certiorari border on the trivial.2 8
In Russia, our hypothetical litigant (who may be an ordinary citizen or a part of
the government, including a member of the Parliament that passed the law or even
the president) need not violate the law to mount a challenge to it, nor would he
2 We stress "basic" because, while the similarities among courts within each
classification may be greater than their differences, important variations do exist. See Alec
Stone, Abstract Constitutional Review and Policy Making in Western Europe, in
COMPARATIVE JUDICIALREVIEW AND PUBUC POuCY 41 (Donald W. Jackson & C. Neal Tate
eds., 1992). Indeed, with regard to the European system (also called the "Austrian" or
"Kelsen" system), some scholars distinguish between the German and French models. In the
former, ordinary citizens can file constitutional complaints, most of which are concrete
disputes that address the ex post constitutionality of statutes; under the French model, only
specified state actors can bring constitutional cases, which the court can address only in the
abstract and only before the statute under review goes into effect. Most European
constitutional courts follow one or the other of these models, or are hybrids. See Lee Epstein
et al., The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of
Democratic Systems of Government, 36 LAw & Soc'Y REV. (forthcoming 2002).
26 We adapt the discussion in the following paragraphs from Epstein et al., supra note 25
(manuscript at 4, available at http://artsci.wustl.edu/-polisci/epstein/research/concts.pdf).
27 id.
28 Or roughly I%. Id.
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begin his case in a lower "ordinary" court. Because he is alleging that the act
violates Russia's constitution, because the ordinary courts do not decide
constitutional cases, and because the only court that does decide constitutional cases
- Russia's Constitutional Court - does not require concrete controversies to
render decisions, our litigant could take his case directly to that court. The only
similarity of note between his plight and that of his American counterpart lies in his
chances of review: the Russian Constitutional Court is even more discretionary
than the U.S. Supreme Court, deciding in recent years less than 0.3% of the
petitions it receives for review."
Table 1: Key Characteristics of Court Systems"
Institutional
Structure (Who
has the power to
engage in judicial
review?)
Timing (When can
judicial review
occur?)
Type (Can judicial
review take place
in the absence of a
real case or
controversy?)
Standing (Who
can initiate
disputes?)
Diffused. Ordinary courts can
engage in judicial review, that is,
they can declare an act
unconstitutional.
Ex Post. Courts can only
exercise judicial review after an
act has occurred or taken effect.
Concrete. Courts can only
resolve concrete cases or
controversies.
Litigants, engaged in a real case
or controversy, who have a
personal and real stake in the
outcome, can bring suit.
Centralized. Only a single
court (usually called a
"constitutional court" [CC])
can exercise judicial review;
other courts are typically
barred from so doing,
though they may refer
constitutional questions to
the CC.
Ex Ante and Ex Post. Many
CCs have ex ante review
over treaties; some have ex
ante review over
governmental acts; others
have both ex ante and ex
post review, while still
others have either but not
both.
Abstract and Concrete
Review. Most CCs can
exercise review in the
absence of a concrete case
or controversy; many can
exercise concrete review as
well.
The range can be large,
from governmental actors
(including executives and
29 Id.
30 See id. (manuscript at 4 tbl. 1).
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What do these distinctions mean for our inventory? Primarily, they forced us
to consider what sorts of courts to include in it. While many possibilities presented
themselves, given the key difference between the two models - namely, whether
constitutional review is centralized or decentralized - we thought it was most
prudent to focus only on rules governing the highest constitutional courts (e.g.,
"supreme courts" in American-type systems and "constitutional courts" in European
ones) in the societies in our sample. In this way, we avoid mixing apples with
oranges, though in our analysis, we remain sensitive to the differences in "supreme"
and "constitutional" courts and illuminate them where they seem particularly
relevant.
C. Sources of Data
Were it the case that we could gather all the requisite data from constitutions,
our task would be easy; certainly easy enough to include virtually every country in
the world in our inventory. Unfortunately, because these documents do not always
reflect changes that have come about in selection mechanisms over time, nor do
they necessarily supply all the details our inventory requires, we could not limit our
search to them. Instead, we needed to augment it by gathering various laws
promulgated by legislatures and other bodies to structure their courts. Here our luck
improved since the vast majority of courts included in our study maintain web sites
containing the relevant documents. When we could not locate the information we
needed from these sites or other primary materials, or when the formal rules were
not entirely transparent, we e-mailed court personnel, who were typically quite
cooperative, and/or consulted secondary sources.3
Accordingly, we feel confident that our inventory provides a reliable account
of rules governing judicial selection and retention circa 2001.32 With this data, we
begin our exploration of the two goals of specific concern here: creating and
sustaining (1) an intellectually and legally distinguished and (2) politically
" For sources available on the Interet, see Constitutional Courts - Presentations, at
http://artsci.wustl.edu/-polisci/epstein/courses/conct/asml.html (last visited Sept. 21,2001).
32 We emphasize this date because institutions pertaining to the appointment and retention
of judges are not static, but rather, can change as a result of various political, legal, social,
or economic factors. This is true in America, where, on average, states have altered their
selection systems 4.8 times; only six states have made no changes in the way they select and
retain their state supreme court justices. See Lee Epstein et al., Selecting Selection Systems
(Oct. 2, 2000) (paper presented at the 2000 annual conference on the Scientific Study of
Judicial Politics, Columbus, Ohio), at http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/-polisci/
epstein/conference/archiveOO/EpsteinKnight.pdf. This is true throughout the world as well.
For example, in Russia, constitutional court justices appointed in 1991 could expect to hold
their jobs for life but those selected after the adoption of the new constitution in 1993 were
granted only a single, limited term. See Epstein et al., supra note 25 (manuscript at 17).
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independent judiciary.
II. CREATING AND SUSTAINING AN INTELLECTUALLY AND LEGALLY
DISTINGUISHED U.S. SUPREME COURT
While scholars may debate precisely what the Framers had in mind when they
drafted provisions relating to the federal courts,33 little doubt exists that they hoped
to attract the intellectually and legally distinguished to the bench. Indeed, they
rejected several proposals regarding the appointment of judges (vesting the power
in the president or the Senate alone, for example) at least in part because they
thought such proposals would lead to the appointment of unqualified jurists.34
Housed in Article II of the U.S. Constitution is the one mechanism they seemed to
think would accomplish that end: a unique system ofjudicial appointment, whereby
the president would nominate and the Senate confirm federal judges.3"
But that is all the Constitution says about judicial selection. The Framers gave
no substantive content to the words "advice and consent"; they provided no clear
standards for the president and Senate to follow to ensure the selection of high-
quality justices and the preservation of a bench of great distinction, despite their
obvious interest in achieving those ends.
As our discussion below reveals, many of the nations in our survey did not go
for such ambiguity. Rather, they attacked the problem before appointment
(qualifications for office) and after nominees attained a seat on their highest court
(retirement provisions).
A. Qualifications for Office
When the Framers drafted the U.S. Constitution, they inserted qualifications for
all elected offices. To wit:
(1) Senators must be at least thirty years old and have been a citizen of the
United States not less than nine years; 36
(2) Representatives must be at least twenty-five years old and have been a
citizen not less than seven years;37
(3) Every member of Congress must be, when elected, an inhabitant of the
33 Compare, e.g., Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 5, with McGinnis, supra note 6.
31 See Mathias, supra note 6, at 202; Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1496-97.
15 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court.").
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
37 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
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state that he or she is to represent; 38
(4) No one may be a member of Congress who holds any other "Office under
the United States"; 39
(5) Presidents must be natural-born citizens who are at least thirty-five years
old and have been residents of the United States for at least fourteen
years.40
But when it came to requirements for the one branch of government composed of
non-elected officials - the federal judiciary - the Framers were notably silent;
nominees for the bench need not have even read in the law, " much less hold a law
degree.
With the exception of France, all twenty-seven nations 2 in our sample took a
different tack, with their constitutions or laws specifying qualifications for office.43
In some instances the relevant provisions are no more detailed than Georgia's,
which simply requires that a candidate for its constitutional court be a citizen "with
the high legal education, who has attained the age of 35."" In others, the list ,of
qualifications for office is long indeed - as is the case in Iceland:
Only a person who fulfils the following conditions may be
commissioned to the office of Supreme Court judge:
(1) Has attained the age of 35 years.
(2) Is an Icelandic national.
(3) Has the necessary mental and physical capacity.
38 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
'9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. In addition, the Fourteenth Amendment states that no
person may be a senator or a representative who, having previously taken an oath as a
member of Congress to support the Constitution, has engaged in rebellion against the United
States or given aid or comfort to its enemies, unless Congress has removed such disability
by a two-thirds vote of both houses. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
40 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
4 Cf. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 265 (2d ed. 1996):
During the early years of the nation's history it was common for lawyers to be
trained by 'reading the law' rather than attending law school. This was
accomplished through self-study by serving as an apprentice under an
experienced lawyer. Only in the more modem period have justices trained in a
formal law school setting.
42 Including all three with American-type supreme courts: Iceland, Ireland, and Estonia
- although the latter has a constitutional chamber within its supreme court.
41 See WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 20.
" The Constitutional Court Law of Georgia, ch. 2, art. 7 (1996) (Geor.), available at
http://www.constcourt.gov.ge/lcourte.html.
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(4) Is legally competent to manage his or her personal and
financial affairs, and has never been deprived of the
control of his or her finances.
(5) Has not committed any criminal act considered to be
infamous in public opinion, or evinced any conduct
detrimental to the trust that persons holding judicial office
generally must enjoy.
(6) Has completed a graduation examination in law, or
graduated from a university with an education deemed
equivalent thereto.
(7) Has for a period not shorter than three years been a
district court judge, Supreme Court lawyer, professor of
law, commissioner of police, magistrate, Director of
Public Prosecutions, Assistant Director of Public
Prosecutions, public prosecutor, Director General of a
Government Ministry, Chief of Office at the Ministry of
Justice, or Ombudsman, or has for such period discharged
a similar function providing similar legal experience.
(8) Is deemed capable to hold the office in the light of his or
her career and knowledge of law.
A person who is, or has been, married to a Supreme Court judge
already in office, or a person related to such judge by blood or marriage by
ascent or descent, or in the second sideline, may not be commissioned to
the office of a Supreme Court judge.45
Though this provision is atypical in length and specificity, one feature of it is
not: the requirement of legal experience. Whether as a judge, professor, or
government attorney, twenty-one of the twenty-seven countries in our sample
(77.8%) mandate some service - with the mean number of years being nearly
nine.46 If we focus only on those twenty-one nations requiring experience, the mean
jumps to twelve.47
4 Act on the Judiciary, ch. 2, § 4 (1998) (Ice.), available at http://brunnur.stjr.is/interpro
/dkm/ dkm.nsf/pages/engjud act.
46 See infra Figure 1. The laws vary considerably on the type of legal experience they
require. We chose to focus on these three because they appear, in various combinations, in
the constitutional documents of many of the countries under consideration here.
47 With a standard deviation of 5.1. Id.
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Figure 1: Years of Legal Experience Required for Service as a Justice in 27
European Nations (Histogram)
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But does such a requirement ensure an intellectually and legally distinctive
bench? This is an exceptionally difficult question to answer - especially in the
context of other nations. What we can do, however, is consider how this criterion
- legal experience as a judge, law professor, or government attorney for twelve
years (the mean number of years for countries requiring service) - would have
affected nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court. Would it have eliminated truly
outstanding jurists? Were those with the requisite experience particularly
prominent members of the Court?
To address these questions, we have amassed a database on the legal service -
whether on federal or state benches, in the nation's law schools, or in government
- of the forty-seven associate justices appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court since
1900.4 We chose to focus exclusively on associatejustices because many countries
have devised selection mechanisms and qualifications for their chief justices
(sometimes called chairs or presidents) that are distinct from those invoked to pick
associates. We consider only the post-I900 period to level the playing field, as
fewer than five justices appointed prior to the turn of the century even possessed a
40 The raw data come from EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 252 tbl. 4.4, 272 tbl. 4-6, 284 tbl.
4-8 & 296 tbl. 4-9.
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law degree, a formal requirement in virtually every country in our sample. 9
Table 2 displays the basic results of our efforts. Using the criterion invoked on
average by the nations in our sample - twelve years of legal experience - note
that just fifteen of the forty-seven associate justices (31.9%) would have had
sufficient service to attain nominationto a European constitutional court. Certainly,
several of those fifteen often appear on lists of "great"justices (e.g., Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr.,5" Benjamin Cardozo5") but the same holds true for at least some of the
thirty-two who do not meet the criterion (e.g., Louis Brandeis,52 Hugo L. Black 3).
'9 Only fifteen even attended law school, much less graduated; the balance "read the law,"
which was quite common during the early years of the country's history. See supra note 41.
5o See SIDNEY H. ASCH, THE SUPREME COURT AND ITS GREAT JUSTICES 83-99 (1971);
ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES 37 (1978);
JOHN P. FRANK, MARBLE PALACE 43 (1958); ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF
AMERICAN LAW 4 & 31 n.2 (1938); Robert C. Bradley, Who are the Great Justices and What
Criteria Did They Meet?, in GREATJUSTICES OFTHEU.S. SUPREMECOURT 1, 14-18 tbls. 1-5
(William D. Pederson & Norman W. Provizer eds., 1993); George R. Currie, A Judicial A l-
Star Nine, 1964 WIS. L. REV. 3, 19-23; Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror
ofJustices, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 781,783 (1957); James E. Hambleton, The All- Time, All-Star,
All-Era Supreme Court, 69 A.B.A. J. 463,464 (1983); Bernard Schwartz, The Judicial Ten:
America's Greatest Judges, 1979 S. ILL. U. L.J. 405, 407, 420-24 (1979).
"' See ASCH, supra note 51, at 143-59; BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 50, at 37;
FRANK, supra note 50, at 43; POUND, supra note 50, at 4 & 31 n.2; Bradley, supra note 50,
at 14-16 tbs. 1-3, 18 tbl. 5; Frankfurter, supra note 50, at 783; Hambleton, supra note 50,
at 464; Schwartz, supra note 50, at 407, 424-28.
52 See ASCH, supra note 50, at 103-16; BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 50, at 37;
FRANK, supra note 50, at 43; Bradley, supra note 50, at 14-16 tbls. 1-3, 18 tbl. 5; Currie,
supra note 50, at 23-27; Frankfurter, supra note 50, at 783; Hambleton, supra note 50, at
464.
53 See ASCH, supra note 50, at 189-203; BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 50, at 37;
Bradley, supra note 50, at 14-18 tbls. 1-5; Hambleton, supra note 50, at 464; Stuart S. Nagel,
Characteristics ofSupreme Court Greatness, 56 A.B.A. J. 957, 957 (1970); Schwartz, supra
note 50, at 407, 428-31.
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Table 2: Prior Legal Experience of Associate Justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court, 1900-2001
Cardozo 19 0 0 Yes
Clark 0 0 17 YesFrankfurter 0 27 8 Yes
Ginsburg 13 17 0 Yes
Holmes 20 1 0 Yes
Kennedy 12 0 0 Yes
Lurton 26 0 0 Yes
O'Connor 7 0 5 Yes
Rutledge 4 20 0 Yes
Scalia 4 12 4 Yes
Souter 13 0 10 Yes
Stone (Associate) 0 19 1 Yes
Van Devanter 8 0 7 Yes
Black 1 0 2 No
Blackmun 13 0 0 No
Brandeis 0 0 0 No
Brennan 7 0 0 No
Burton 0 0 3 No
Butler 0 0 6 No
Byrnes 0 0 2 No
Clarke 2 0 0 No
Day 8 0 0 No
Douglas 0 8 0 No
Fortas 0 5 1 No
Goldberg 0 3 0 No
Harlan 1 0 6 No
14 Includes both state and federal experience.
" Excludes experience as instructor or lecturer; includes experience at the assistant or
professor levels or as a dean.
' Must be service in legal capacity (e.g., as a state attorney general or counsel to a
legislative committee or in the U.S. Justice Department), not simply (non-legal) stints in the
White House or in an executive agency.
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Hughes 0 2 1 No
(Associate)
Jackson 0 0 7 No
Lamar 2 0 0 No
Marshall 4 0 2 No
McReynolds 0 0 5 No
Minton 8 0 1 No
Moody 0 0 9 No
Murphy 7 0 2 No
Pitney 11 0 0 No
Powell 0 0 0 No
Reed 0 0 10 No
Rehnquist 0 0 2 No
(Associate)
Roberts 0 0 10 No
Sanford 15 0 2 No
Stevens 5 0 3 No
Stewart 3 0 0 No
Thomas 1 0 3 No
White 2 0 1 No
Whittaker 3 0 0 No
On the one hand, our results seem to indicate that the imposition of the (rather
stringent) experience criterion would have deprived the Court of a handful of its
most distinguished members. On the other hand, it is possible that some or even all
of the thirty-two "ineligibles" would have adapted their career paths to the relevant
service requirement and, thus, would still have been eligible for appointment to the
bench; after all, strategic behavior in pursuit of a spot on the nation's highest court
is not unknown.
Moreover, in perusing Table 2, we cannot help but wonder whether the
president and Senate in the United States have defacto adopted some version of a
service requirement. To illustrate, we need only consider that only two - John
Paul Stevens and Clarence Thomas - of the nine justices on the current Court do
not meet it (and Stevens, the Court's most senior associate, comes rather close). 7
The other seven all served as judges (Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Anthony Kennedy, and Antonin Scalia held positions on the U.S. circuit courts prior
to their appointment to the Court; David Souter and Sandra Day O'Connor, on state
courts; and William H. Rehnquist, of course, was an associate justice on the
Supreme Court before ascending to the Chief Justiceship), as professors (Breyer at
Harvard; Ginsburg at Rutgers and Columbia; and Scalia at Virginia and Chicago),
" Rehnquist did not meet the requirement at the time of his initial appointment to the
Court but would have when he ascended to the chief justiceship - a position he attained
after fourteen years of service as associate justice.
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or as government attorneys (Breyer for the U.S. Justice Department and U.S. Senate
Judiciary Committee; O'Connor for San Mateo, California and the state of Arizona;
Scalia for the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy and the U.S.
Justice Department; and Souter for the state of New Hampshire).
Whether this trend will continue is a question on which we can only speculate;
we do know that many of the lawyers (apparently and presently) under
consideration for a spot on the U.S. Supreme Court hold (or have held) legal
positions in government or seats in the nation's judiciary, including J. Michael
Luttig, Emilio Garza, Alberto Gonzales, and Edith Jones. It also seems to be the
case that America's current president, George W. Bush, has made nominations to
the U.S. Courts of Appeals and other government posts (such as, Miguel Estrada
and Theodore Olson) with an eye toward elevating them to the High Court. This
strikes us as nearly explicit (though certainly unstated) adoption of a norm of legal
experience.
B. Retirement Age
Attempting to place outstanding nominees on the bench is one thing; preserving
quality and distinction is quite another. Various countries in our sample have
devised a number of institutions designed to maximize this objective, with none
more prevalent than the compulsory retirement age.5" As Figure 2 shows, nearly
half (twelve of the twenty-seven) have such a mandate, with a mean of 68.6 years
for those possessing it. And we suspect this figure would be even higher if not for
the presence of limited terms (formal provisions permitting justices to serve for only
a set number of years), which may negate the need for compulsory retirement. In
fact, of the six nations with life tenure, two-thirds 9 have compulsory retirement
provisions; of the twenty-one countries with limited terms, only about a third have
compulsory retirement provisions.6° To put it another way, the United States,
lacking either a mandatory retirement age or limited terms for members of its
highest constitutional court, is something of an anomaly - at least compared with
the countries in our sample.
s The societies in our sample are not the only ones with mandatory retirement provisions
for their justices; indeed, in the United States alone, thirty-six states have such provisions -
with the U.S. Supreme Court upholding them in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
'9 Four of the six. See infra Figure 2.
Eight of the twenty-one (38.1%). Id.
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Figure 2: Compulsory Retirement Ages for Justices in 27 European Nations
(Histogram) 61
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Of course, compulsory retirement ages (or limited terms, for that matter) do not
guarantee the preservation of a quality court; we doubt that any formal rule, in and
of itself, could accomplish this end. Then again, both academics and political
observers alike, suggest that forced retirement may, at a minimum, work to reduce
the presence of "mental decrepitude" on the bench.62 This, at least according to
David Garrow, has not been a trivial problem on the U.S. Supreme Court; indeed,
he identifies eight justices appointed since 1900 whom he believes were not
intellectually up to the task before they stepped down from the bench: Oliver
61 [0] indicates no compulsory retirement age.
62 See David J. Garrow, Mental Decreptitude on the U.S. Supreme Court: The Historical
Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 995 (2000), which provides an accounting
of the many jurists and politicians who favored mandatory retirement provisions, along with
attempts to effectuate one sort or another. Certainly, at least some mentioned in Garrow
supported such provisions for reasons quite apart from preserving an intellectually vibrant
bench. But the number of proponents among former Supreme Court justices (e.g., Charles
Evans Hughes, Earl Warren) is impressive indeed. Moreover, Garrow is not the only scholar
advocating mandatory retirement. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation
Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1202 (1988); Philip D. Oliver, Systematic
Justice: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Establish Fixed, Staggered Terms for
Members of the United States Supreme Court, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 799 (1986).
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Wendell Holmes, Jr.;63 Frank Murphy;64 Sherman Minton;65 Charles Whittaker;66
Hugo L. Black;67 William 0. Douglas;6" Lewis F. Powell, Jr.;69 and Thurgood
Marshall.7"
Would a compulsory retirement at age sixty-nine (the mean in our sample) have
worked to eliminate or at least reduce the problem? To consider this question, we
amassed data on all post- 1900 associate justices who remained on the Court past the
age of sixty-nine, with Table 3 displaying the results, as well as some other details
surrounding departures from the bench.7
Table 3: Associate Justices Remaining on the Court Past the Age of Sixty-
Nine, 1900-2001
Black (85) 1971 1955 16
Blackmun (85) 1994 1978 16
Brandeis (82) 1939 1926 13
Brennan (84) 1990 1975 15
Burton (70) 1958 1957 1
Butler (73) 1939 1935 4
Day (73) 1922 1918 4
Douglas (77) 1975 1967 8
Frankfurter (79) 1962 1952 10
Harlan (72) 1971 1968 3
Holmes (90) 1932 1911 21
Lurton (70) 1914 1913 1
Marshall (83) 1991 1977 14
Garrow, supra note 62, at 1017-18.
Id. at 1027-28.
Id. at 1043-45.
Id. at 1045-50.
Id. at 1050-52.
Id. at 1052-56.
Id. at 1069-70.
Id. at 1072-80.
For raw data, see EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 361 tbl. 5-7.
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McReynolds (78) 1941 1932 9
Powell (79) 1987 1977 10
Reed (72) 1957 1954 3
Roberts (70) 1945 1944 1
Stone (73) 1946 1942 4
Sutherland (75) 1938 1932 6
Van Devanter (78) 1937 1928 9
White (76) 1993 1986 7
First, of the thirty-eight justices in the relevant subset of our total sample (the
subset that excludes members of the current Court), twenty-one (those depicted in
Table 3) or, 55.3 percent, remained on the bench after the age of sixty-nine. The
average age of departure for those twenty-one was 77.3 with a standard deviation
of 5.8, meaning that over two-thirds stayed on the Court at least two years longer
than many European provisions would have permitted.
Now reconsider Garrow's list. Would mandatory retirement have helped reduce
incidents of "mental decrepitude"? Using the age of sixty-nine as a benchmark, the
answer seems clear: of the eight justices identified by Garrow, only three -
Murphy (59), Minton (65), and Whittaker (61) - would not have been forced off
the bench prior to the onset of their "decrepitude"; the other five (Holmes, Black,
Douglas, Powell, and Marshall) would have retired, on average, 13.8 years before
they did in fact depart.
And, yet, we cannot help but note that some distinguished careers would have
been, perhaps regrettably so, cut short. Take William J. Brennan, whom scholars
have rated as one of the "greats."" Though he was eighty-four when he retired,
there is no indication - at least not in Garrow's comprehensive survey73 - that he
suffered from any mental infirmities during the latter part of his service. To the
contrary, between the ages of sixty-nine (1975) and eighty-four (1990), Brennan,
among other activities, cobbled together coalitions of justices sufficient in size to
produce opinions of the Court, 74 brokered numerous agreements among his
colleagues," and authored scores of "salient" opinions,76 including United
72 See Bradley, supra note 50, at 14 tbl. 1.
71 See Garrow, supra note 62.
71 See LEE EPSTEIN &JACKKNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 6-9 (1998); FORREST
MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT 1-5, 34 (2000).
71 See EPSTEIN &KNIGHT, supra note 74, at 69-70, 76; MALTZMAN ETAL., supra note 75,
at 96.
76 See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience: List of Salient U.S.
Supreme Court Cases 18-28 (2000), at http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/-polisci/epstein/ajps/
salience.pdf. See generally Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44
AM. J. POL. SCI. 66 (2000) (explaining the use of media coverage as a measure of issue
salience in U.S. Supreme Court decisions).
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Steelworkers of America v. Weber," Plyler v. Doe,"8 Aguilar v. Felton,79 South
Carolina v. Baker,8" Texas v. Johnson,8 and Ruttan v. Republican Party of
Illinois,82 to name just a few.
Moreover, it is possible that some justices - again, including a smattering of
those who regularly appear on lists of truly distinguished jurists - would never
have attained a nomination had a compulsory retirement age existed. We think here
of Benjamin N. Cardozo, whom Herbert Hoover appointed to the bench at age sixty-
one. Had a departure provision been in effect and had Hoover felt any concern for
leaving a legacy on the Court, it seems reasonable to suspect that he would not have
turned to Cardozo in the first place.8" On the flip side, several Court members
whom scholars have rated as "average" or even "failures" may not have gotten the
nod either.84 Then again, it is possible that compulsory retirement would
sufficiently change the strategic context in which the relevant actors operate to
make older candidates attractive - especially in periods of divided government.
What then are we to make of the effect a mandatory retirement provision would
have on the Supreme Court? Surely the answer depends on whether we Americans
think that sort of cure for the problem of mental decrepitude is worse than the
problem itself or, to put it in slightly different terms, whether we should pursue the
goal of preserving an intellectually distinct bench via a method - mandatory
retirement - that might actually undermine it.
It seems beyond doubt that compulsory departure provisions would have
fundamentally changed the composition of past Supreme Courts, as well as the
current one.85 Four of the nine would no longer be active justices, with Ginsburg's
retirement imminent. Our current president might have already made one
appointment - a replacement for Kennedy - with another on the way.86 But it
was President Clinton who may have been the biggest beneficiary.87 While, on
average, presidents have the opportunity to make four appointments over the course
of two terms, Clinton was able to fill only two vacancies. A mandatory retirement
provision could have potentially brought his total to the more typical figure of four.
7 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
78 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
79 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
80 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
SI 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
82 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
83 As history would have it, Cardozo died in office at sixty-eight.
8 See, e.g., BLAUSTEN & MERSKY, supra note 50, at 39 (rating Horace H. Lurton, age
sixty-five at the time of appointment, as "average"); id. at 40, (rating Sherman Minton, age
fifty-eight, as a "failure").
85 See infra Table 4.
86 We might question whether Clinton would have given the nod to Ginsburg, age sixty
at the time of her nomination, in the first place, thereby lessening the odds that Bush would
be looking at a second appointment.
87 We stress "might" and "may" because we do not assess the effect of a mandatory
retirement provision on previous Courts.
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Table 4: The Potential Effect of Compulsory Retirement (at Age Sixty-Nine)
on the Current Supreme Court (2001)
Breyer 62 2008
Ginsburg 68 2002
Kennedy 69 2001
O'Connor 71 1998
Rehnquist 77 1993
Scalia 65 2005
Bush
Bush
Clinton
ClintonClno
Souter 61 2009 ?
Stevens 81 1989 Bush
Thomas 53 2017 ?
This leads us to one final point: Clinton may have lost out on two nomination
opportunities because "early" retirement, unlike the criterion of legal experience,
is not a norm or even close to becoming one. The lesson is thus clear. If Americans
view compulsory retirement as a feasible mechanism for preserving the quality of
the bench, then they will need to bring it about via constitutional reform. With over
half the Court now surpassing the age of sixty-nine, they cannot count on the
Justices themselves to effectuate it.
Ifl. CREATING AND SUSTAINING A POLITICALLY INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY
Unlike the goals of creating and preserving a distinguished judiciary, that of
creating and preserving an independent one is far more open to discussion. In the
first place, scholars and other observers have offered a slew of definitions of the
term "independent," variously identifying it as:
[The ability of judges to be free] from political pressures and public
outcry in order to settle disputes between parties fairly."8
[T]he degree to which judges believe they can decide and do decide
consistent with their own personal attitudes, values and conceptions of
judicial role (in their interpretation of the law).., in opposition to what
others, who have or are believed to have political or judicial power,
think about or desire in like matters, and ... particularly when a decision
88 CHARLES H. SHELDON & LINDA S. MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE RECRUITMENTOF
STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES 18 (1997).
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adverse to the beliefs or desires of those with political or judicial power
may bring some retribution on the judge personally or on the power of
the court.8 9
[The ability ofjudges not to] make decisions on the basis of the sorts of
political factors (for example, the electoral strength of the people
affected by a decision) that would influence and in most cases control
the decision were it to be made by a legislative body such as the U.S.
Congress.90
[T]he right of judges to be free from inappropriate control by others in
the exercise of judicial decisionmaking.9'
However diverse these definitions may be in their specifics, a common thread
runs through them. Namely, justices operate under maximal levels of independence
when they are nearly always able to act sincerely - that is, to act on the basis of
their own, sincerely-held preferences (whatever those preferences may be and
regardless of the preferences of other relevant political actors) - without fear of
facing reprisals from the public or the political regime. In other words, when
justices are "independent" they will face low or even no opportunity costs for acting
sincerely. But, as they move from maximal levels of independence to maximal
levels of accountability, the opportunity costs for judges to act in accord with their
own preferences (at least when those preferences are contrary to those of other
relevant politicians) increase, leading them to engage in sophisticated behavior (that
is, behavior that is not in line with their sincere preferences). Hence, to us the
concept of judicial independence - especially as it pertains to institutions
governing judicial selection and retention mechanisms - implicates the opportunity
costs to justices of acting sincerely: the greater the accountability established in the
institution, the higher the opportunity cost forjudges to act sincerely, and, thus, the
more extensive sophisticated behavior will be.9
89 THEODORE L. BECKER, COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL POLITICS 144 (1970).
9o William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 875 n.1 (1975).
"' Scott H. Bice, Judicial Independence and Accountability Symposium: Foreword, 72
S. CAL. L. REV. 311, 312 (1999).
" Of course it is true that most judicial specialists Lt nd to speak in far more specific terms
than do we. So, for example, rather than make claims about opportunity costs associated with
particular selection institutions, they argue that justices who are "accountable" to, say, the
public via elections, are more likely to suppress dissents than are their appointed
counterparts. See, e.g., RICHARD A. WATSON & RONDALG. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE
BENCH AND THE BAR 321-22 & tbl. 9.4 (1969); Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Integrated
Models of Dissent, 55 J. POL 914, 919 (1993); Kenneth N. Vines, Political Functions on a
State Supreme Court, in STUDIES IN JUDICIAL POLITICS 51, 70 (Kenneth N. Vines & Herbert
Jacob eds., 1962). They also argue that such justices are more likely to reach decisions that
reflect popular sentiment. See, e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515 (1995) (Stevens,
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Defining judicial "independence" is not the only source of disagreement among
scholars. Yet another is over the question of whether judicial independence is even
a desirable end - that we rather ought to work toward more accountable benches.93
We ourselves are not unsympathetic to this perspective; after all, if justices make
decisions in line with their own personal political preferences or those of their
"constituents" - rather than on the basis of "neutral" principles, as so much of the
literature suggests they do94 - then why should we not hold them accountable in
much the same way as we do elected officials?
For purposes of this essay, though, let us take the more conventional route and
assume that an independent judiciary - in the way that we have defined
"independent" - is a desirable end. What sorts of formal rules do societies invoke
to attain it?
In the United States, the answer is apparent: we do not force federal jurists to
function in a high opportunity cost environment - one in which they must attain
re-election to retain their jobs - but rather, bestow them with life tenure.
Releasing judges from the control of the electorate, the Framers felt, would be a -
if not the - chief mechanism by which to achieve judicial independence.95 While
legislators and the executive would, by virtue of their electoral connection,
necessarily reflect the popular will, judges could confine their attention to the law;
they would stand above the political fray and enforce the law free from overt
political forces and influences, and not pay a high price (for example, the loss of
their position) for doing so.
And yet, most societies in our sample chose a very different path. As Table 5
shows, only six opted for life tenure; the other twenty-one opted for limited terms
of two varieties: renewable and nonrenewable. Under the former, a justice would
be able to serve an additional term(s) if she attained approval (typically) from
whatever bodies appointed her in the first instance. Under non-renewable tenure
systems, once the justice completes his term, he may not be reappointed.
J., dissenting); DANIELR. PINELLO, THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODON STATE-
SUPREME-COURT POLICY 130 (1995); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty:
Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 689, 726-29 (1995); Gerard S.
Gryski et al., Models of State High Court Decision Making in Sex Discrimination Cases, 48
J. POL. 143, 148-49 (1986); Melinda Gann Hall, Constituent Influence in State Supreme
Courts: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study, 49 J. POL. 1117 (1987); Alexander Tabarrok
& Eric Helland, Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157
(1999). To us, these are merely examples of the more general phenomenon; namely, the
greater the accountability established in the institution, the higher the opportunity costs for
judges to act sincerely.
" See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 74; JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral
Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J. POL. 427 (1992).
94 See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 75, at 11; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 94,
at 17-18; Hall, supra note 93, at 430.
9' See EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 13, at 58.
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Table 5:
Retention Mechanisms for Justices Serving on Constitutional Courts in
27 European Nations
Life Tenure
Renewable Terms
Non-Renewable Terms
22.2
25.9
51.9
Country-specific distinctions exist, of course, but variation in term length is not
huge. Whether renewable or nonrenewable, it ranges from six to twelve years, with
a mean of 93;96 the means for countries with renewable and non-renewable service
are quite comparable, at 9.1 and 9.4 respectively.97
Figure 3: Length of Terms for Justices Serving on Constitutional Courts in 21
European Nations (Histogram)
12 Mean=9 3
Slandard Devtation-i.4
N-21
10
Length of Terms [minimum, maximum]
But the question remains: do these sorts of retention mechanisms - those that
fail to provide for life tenure - necessarily lead to a less independent judiciary?
We might begin answering this question with what is a hardly controversial
response these days: no formal retention rule can guarantee judicial independence.
This is so for any number of reasons, with a significant one being that courts are not
the only players in their systems of government. Hence, if justices wish to issue
" See infra Figure 3.
97 id.
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efficacious policy - policy that the public and the political regime will respect and
with which they will comply - they will necessarily need to pay heed to the
preferences and likely actions of those other relevant actors. This is as true in the
United States, even with its automatic guarantee of life tenure, as it is in Slovakia.
To see this we need only think of Professor William N. Eskridge's seminal research,
showing among other things, that (1) justices of the United States Supreme Court
should and do interpret laws in line with the policy preferences of contemporary
political actors (including the president and members of Congress, especially
congressional "gatekeepers," such as committee chairs and party leaders) rather
than in accord with the intent of the enacting legislators; and (2) justices should and
do behave in this way even if their policy preferences are out of line with the desires
of contemporary political actors.98 For when justices are inattentive to the
preferences of the contemporaneous Congress and president - that is, when they
fail to act strategically99 - they run the risk of seeing their preferred interpretations
overridden by the political branches. To put it in somewhat different terms, justices
have goals which, according to Eskridge, amount to seeing their policy preferences
written into law,'00 but realize that they cannot achieve them without taking into
account the preferences and likely actions of other relevant political actors.
98 See William N. Eskridge Jr., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 69-80 (1994);
William N. Eskridge Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331, 373-77 (1991); William N. Eskridge Jr., Reneging on History?: Playing the
Court/Congress/President CivilRights Game, 79 CAL. L. REv. 613,664-66 (1991); William
N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of
American Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1359-60 (1994). Eskridge's findings pertain
to statutory interpretation, but recent research indicates that his basic results apply to
constitutional interpretation as well. See Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court as a Strategic
National Policy Maker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 600 (2001).
" Strategic decision-making is "about interdependent choice: an individual's action is,
in part, a function of her expectations about the actions of others. To say that a justice acts
strategically is to say that she realizes that her success or failure depends on the preferences
of other actors and the actions she expects them to take, not just on her own preferences and
actions." EPSTEIN &KNIGHT, supra note 74, at 13. Sometimes, strategic calculations will lead
a justice to make decisions that reflect her sincerely-held preferences (sincere behavior);
other times, they will lead her to act in ways that do not accurately reflect her true preferences
(insincere or sophisticated behavior).
100 Eskridge is not alone: many proponents of strategic approaches to statutory
interpretation assume that the goal of most justices is to see the law reflect their most
preferred policy positions. See, e.g., id.; Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael Gely, Congressional
Control or Judicial ndependence: The Determinants ofUS. Supreme Court Labor-Relation
Decisions, 23 RAND J. ECON. 463 (1992). But this need not be the case. Strategic actors -
including justices - can be, in principle, motivated by many things. As long as the ability
of a justice to achieve his or her goal, whatever that may be, is contingent on the actions of
others (as Eskridge suggests), his or her decision is interdependent and strategic. For an
example of a strategic account of judicial decisions in which justices are motivated by
jurisprudential principles, see John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, A Positive Theory of
Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 263 (1992).
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This noted, we do believe that particular formal retention-mechanisms are more
(or less) likely than others to induce judicial independence, in the way we have
defined that term. In the United States, for example, scholars have told us that when
state supreme court justices know that they must face periodic electoral checks to
retain their positions, they engage in sophisticated behavior, such as ruling in favor
of the government in death penalty cases when they would prefer to find for the
defendant.'0 '
The same may be said of renewable terms. It seems to us undoubtedly the case
that when societies require sitting justices to attain reapproval to retain their seats,
those societies are seeking accountability at the cost of independence. But what of
the difference between renewable terms and life tenure? Are justices operating
under one or the other more or less likely to act "independently," or, under our
definition of independence, to behave in a sincere fashion? The answer, at first
blush, seems as transparent as it is for renewable terms: undoubtedly, life tenure
provides the greatest degree of independence if only because ajustice serving under
a set term may have political aspirations after her tenure expires. Under those
circumstances, she may act in a sophisticated fashion over the course of her judicial
career to maximize her chances of successfully pursuing a political one.'
On second look, however, the answer is less clear. First (and if the United
States is any indication), it seems unlikely that most justices would be in a position
to pursue a political career after serving on the Court. Just consider that the mean
age of associate justices appointed since 1900 is 53.6.103 Adding 9.3 (the mean
length of terms in Europe) to this figure brings the total to near sixty-three years of
age - more than a decade older than the current U.S. president, as well as his
predecessor. And even if the total drops lower - to, say, fifty - it would be
possible for Congress to enact legislation prohibiting former justices from seeking
public office.'0 4
Second, and more to the point, a set, non-renewable term may actually promote
and sustain judicial independence in the long run - by preserving the legitimacy
of the high court as an independent branch of government. We base this claim on
an empirical comparison we conducted of periods of congressional attacks on the
Court and those of relative calm between the two branches. Specifically, we
examined the length of service of justices serving during two sets of years that
elicited a "high frequency" of "Court-attacking" bills in Congress (1935-1937,
1963-1965) and those that did not (1941-1943, 1972-1974). "° Figure 4 displays the
"01 See, e.g., Hall, supra note 92, at 1120.
102 See, e.g., Oliver, supra note 62, at 818 (arguing in favor of a constitutional amendment
that would set fixed, staggered terms for Supreme Court Justices but, nonetheless, asserting
that such an amendment, compared with the current system of life tenure, would lead to "a
slight decrease in the independence of the Court").
"03 See EPSTEIN ETAL., supra note 41, at 305 tbl. 4-11.
14 See Oliver, supra note 62, at 829.
0' See Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power,
54 REV. POL. 369, 379 (1992) (displaying the number of "court-attacking" bills during nine
periods in U.S. history).
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results.
Figure 4: Comparison of Lengths of Service of Justices Serving on Courts
under Congressional Attack and Those Serving During Periods of Relative
Calm
14.
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Consider, first, the comparison between the period of 1935-1937 - tension-
filled years for the Court, with the introduction of thirty-seven "Court-attacking"
bills in Congress,06 including of course, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's famous
"Court-packing" scheme - and the period of 1941-1943 - years of relatively
peaceful relations between the justices and legislators, with members of Congress
proposing far fewer bills designed to curb their independence. Note the difference
in the mean length of service of justices sitting on those Courts, 13.7 years versus
4.3 years.0 7 Had some version of non-renewable terms been in effect, say one
creating a tenure of nine years - only three of the justices serving on the 1935-
1937 Court would have been on the bench: Hughes (appointed Chief Justice in
1930); Owen J. Roberts (1930); and Benjamin Cardozo (1932). None of the "four
horsemen" -justices who consistently voted against New Deal legislation thereby
provoking the wrath of FDR"8 --. would have been in active service. Willis Van
Devanter would have departed in 1919; James Clark McReynolds, in 1923; George
Sutherland, in 1931; and Pierce Butler, in 1931.
Turning to the 1963-65 and 1972-74 comparison, we see a smaller disparity
106 Id.
017 See supra Figure 4.
They were often joined by Justice Owen J. Roberts.
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between the "attacked" (114 Court-curbing bills were proposed in Congress
between 1963 and 1965) and the relatively "unattacked" Court (the 1972-1974 years
do not make list of "high-attack" periods,0 ? despite the furor caused by Roe v.
Wade'): the mean lengths of service were 11.1 and 9.2, respectively."' Part of the
explanation for this result, however, lies with the presence of a true outlier on the
1972-1974 Court: William 0. Douglas, who, by 1972, had served for thirty-three
years. The next closest in length of service, Brennan, had only been on the bench
fifteen years.
Removing Douglas (who left the Court in 1975) from the calculations reduces
the mean to 6.3 years. But even retaining him leaves us with an important (though
perhaps unsurprising) result: on average, justices serving on "attacked" courts had
held their positions for 12.4 years - three years above the mean term in Europe.
That figure forjustices serving on the 1941-1943 and 1972-1974 Courts falls to 6.8
- roughly two years below the mean European term.
Surely then, at least based on our data, courts with newer justices are less
susceptible to congressional attacks than those with more senior members. This is
not, as we emphasize above, a surprising finding. Quite the opposite: it sits
compatibly with a long line of literature suggesting that it is holdovers from old
regimes that have led to some of the more serious instances of Court-curbing in
American history. 2 But to what does this speak in terms of our interest in judicial
independence?
The answer seems straightforward: if we define judicial independence as the
ability to behave sincerely, that is, in- line with truly-held preferences, then non-
renewable terms may be a better mechanism for inducing such behavior than life
tenure. To see this, think of the plight of a justice when she first arrives at the
Court: in all likelihood, she will share the preferences of the regime that appointed
her," 3 thereby enabling her (for the most part) to vote in a sincere fashion without
fear of congressional reprisal. As time goes on, however, and subsequent elections
replace members of "her" regime with those that may not share her preferences, she
becomes less and less able to vote sincerely, assuming she does not want to face the
ire of Congress, the president, or both. Under such circumstances, her
"independence" - again, in the way we have defined - may be curtailed no matter
what course of action she takes. If she votes in a sophisticated fashion, that is, in
a way that accords with the preferences of the new regime, she is hardly
"independent"; if she votes sincerely, that is, in a way that does not accord with the
preferences of the new regime, she (or more precisely, her Court) may confront a
hostile political environment - one that could take any number of actions to curb
her independence or otherwise render inefficacious her institution. Under a
'o See Rosenberg, supra note 106.
0 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
. See supra Figure 4..
" See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as
a National Policymaker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285-86 (1957).
"' See Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Buyer Beware?: Presidential Success Through Supreme
Court Appointments, 53 POL RES. Q. 557, 559, 564, 569 (2000).
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relatively short (say, nine-year) non-renewable term system, the Hobson choice she
confronts would, in all likelihood, disappear; she would be able to vote sincerely for
that period.
IV. DISCUSSION
At the onset we raised a deceptively simply question: if creating and preserving
a legally distinguished and independent bench are important objectives, what
selection and retention mechanisms would maximize their attainment? Given the
normative nature of this question, our ensuing (and preliminary) attempt to address
it has not led to any definitive answers. There is still much work to be done. But
our analysis is certainly suggestive. If we hold as a goal the establishment and
maintenance of a distinguished bench, then we might put some teeth in the norms
(if such norms in fact exist) currently in effect to induce it. We ought to think about
the possibility of giving substantive content to constitutional scriptures for the
selection ofjustices by specifying qualifications for office and mandating retirement
prior to the age of seventy; likewise, for the aim of establishing an independent
judiciary. Conventional wisdom among American scholars (not to mention the
Framers) seems to be that life tenure is the best, if not the only, mechanism for
achieving that end. Our analysis of non-renewable terms - an institution used
quite frequently in the European context - suggests otherwise - that, in fact, it
may be more effective at encouraging sincere behavior on the part of justices.
But more important than these prescriptions, at least to us, is the type of
investigation we undertook to arrive at them - a comparative study of judicial
selection and retention. While we have not demonstrated that European practices
ought to be transported lock, stock, and barrel to the United States, we have shown
the importance of looking at practices elsewhere before we contemplate making
changes, small or large, in our system. Only by doing so, perhaps ironically
enough, can we truly shed light on the existing institutions we Americans have
come to accept but so often fail to question. This certainly holds true for judicial
selection and retention, but we can imagine many others for which it would hold as
well, such as questions involving the timing and type of judicial review and
standing. We commend these and other issues to scholars for further, truly
comparative, analyses.
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